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FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

By JERRY L. HAGGARD*

The topic "Federalism and Environmental Law" assigned to
me is not limited to the public lands defined in section 10 of the
Public Land Law Review Commission's Organic Act (P.L. 88606).' I am glad not to be so limited because the problems created
by this topic apply to all lands and all people in the United
States.
The terms "federal," and "federalism," and "federal government" seem to have taken on an increasingly negative connotation in recent years. The pervasion of federal influence into the
daily lives of so many people must be a large part of the reason
for this. By requirements like seat belts and school busing,
through radio and TV commercials for federal agencies, and by
innumerable other activities, every person, in business or private
life, is affected intimately each day by federal programs.
The burden imposed by government regulations is of very
great concern to business. In a survey taken last year, 60% of the
2,274 responding small businesses ranked government regulations
as one of their three most urgent problems. All industries surveyed, except transportation and communications, ranked government regulations as the most urgent small business problem.
Direct federal expenditures for regulating business are expected
to increase from $2.9 billion in fiscal year 1976 to $3.5 billion in
fiscal year 1977 and to $3.8 billion by the end of fiscal year 1978.2
Much of this increased federal regulation has, of course, been
brought about by environmental controls. Between 1970 and
1976, annual federal outlays for pollution control, grants, and
studies increased from $2.8 billion to $6.9 billion per year.' Most
of this increase, of course, has been in expenditures by the Environmental Protection Agency. Annual expenditures by industry
for federally required pollution abatement will increase from
*
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$11.3 billion in 19711 to an estimated $34.5 billion in 1983.1 The
Environmental Protection Agency has increased the number of
its employees to more than 10,000 today since its creation seven
years ago and has requested a 2,500-employee increase for fiscal
year 1978.6
That federal environmental controls are a dominant influence on our business and private lives is clear. The more interesting questions are: How did we get into this position and what are
the effects of federal controls? In considering the question of how
federal control has become so dominant, a scholarly presentation
would include a fascinating discussion on the sources of federal
authority. It would discuss federal authority over navigable waters which extend upstream into dry washes. It would discuss the
limits (if any) of the commerce power and whether the federal
government has a police power. (This is academic, of course,
because with the commerce power expanded by the courts, who
needs the police power?) One would also expect a discussion of
the restrictions on these powers, including improper delegation,
equal protection, the taking issue, and due process. None of those
subjects will be discussed in this presentation.
As much writing, discussion, and litigation as there has been
on these subjects, it is somewhat surprising that these questions
are seldom raised as each new federal environmental program is
introduced into a state or local community. These questions may
be raised by industry or property owners after a program has been
geared up through the state machinery and put into effect, but
they are seldom raised when Congress, EPA, or another federal
agency approaches a state, dangling the green carrot to assist the
state in "cooperating" with the new federal program.
The devices used to induce states to adopt federal programs
would be worth a study in itself. The federal government has
utilized nearly every weakness present in state and local governments to induce the adoption of federal environmental programs.
These weaknesses include the need for money, a desire for local
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governmental autonomy, state bureaucracies desiring to expand
their staffs and authorities, and the motherhood-apple pie political appeal of environmental protection pervading all other reasons.
Although, from the nature of the governmental activity involved in environmental protection, one would expect that the
direct forces of the federal commerce power or the police power
(if there is any) would be applied to induce state cooperation, it
is curious to observe that another governmental power is utilized
indirectly, much more widely, and much more effectively. That
is the power to tax and to create money. Federal environmental
grants returning tax money to the states with strings (or shackles)
attached are a most powerful force in inducing state adoption of
these programs. The grants usually are made available in two
forms. First, as provided for in the Solid Waste Disposal Act 7 and
under section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 8
funds are granted to conduct studies, to set up planning and
control systems, to hire personnel, and to obtain the necessary
state legislation. Many of these funds are made available to the
staffs of regional government organizations within the states,
many of which have acquired characteristics of federal agency
subagencies.
When the personnel are hired, the studies are completed, and
the program is established, the system exists, lacking only the
legislative authority to implement it. This situation, of course,
removes a state legislature from the more tenable position of
refusing to create a new office or a new program, and places it in
the more difficult position of having to abolish an existing office
and program.
Adding to the irresistibility of the federal environmental programs are the grant-sharing funds made available to states if they
implement the program. This makes the financial bullet somewhat less difficult to bite for the initial passage of the state legislation. The issue can be made into one of losing federal funds if
the legislation is not passed. But then, typically, the federal funds
are phased out after several years and the state is left on its own
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6941-6949 (1977).
33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. IV 1974).
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to either finance or repeal the program. It is, of course, a maxim
of government that it is incomparably more difficult to repeal
legislation than it is to enact it, particularly environmental legislation. There is the further difficulty that an additional bureaucracy has been established, personnel have been hired, and a system is operating. It is an extremely unusual case in which a
legislative body would repeal legislation under these circumstances.
The compounding of those federal programs which do provide for continuing funding has a secondary result which is quite
effective. As states come to depend upon continuing funding, the
threat of decreasing or eliminating those existing programs becomes a very effective method to induce the adoption of and
compliance with new programs.
Another positive inducement for states to accept federal environmental programs is the strong desire to manage their own
affairs. It is found frequently in air and water quality and waste
disposal statutes that the state may conduct the program if approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. If the state program is not approved, EPA will carry out the program in the
state. This presents state legislatures with another dilemna. It
is not politically healthy to open oneself to the charge of abrogating state authority and responsibility to a federal agency. There
is also the concern that EPA restrictions will be greater than
those which EPA would approve if the state prepared and carried
out its own program.
Finally, there is the method of encouraging state compliance
by threatening to withhold permits under other environmental
programs. This method is used in section 208 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act' to induce states to develop a statewide water management program. The failure to do so can result
in the denial of state authority to administer local pollutantdischarge programs. 0
With EPA's arsenal of gentle persuasion available to apply
federal environmental programs to state and local matters, it
becomes unnecessary to utilize the more brutal federal constitutional powers to accomplish the same goals.
9Id.
30
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There may be a trend commencing for states to swallow their
pride of autonomy and to tell EPA that, if the program is to be
enforced, EPA will have to do it. This has occurred in Arizona,
at least in this session of its legislature, with respect to implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act, I and the automobile emission testing program was threatened with the same fate. I understand that a similar disposition was made of legislation in New
Mexico this year. This, of course, is not welcomed by EPA' because, even with 10,000 employees, there is a limit to the number
of EPA personnel available to administer specific state programs.
Also, EPA prefers to have any public dissatisfaction with the
enforcement of programs directed toward the state rather than
toward EPA.
Although federal regulation has been the source of considerable complaint and concern, there has not been any quantitative
determination of what the effects of individual regulations, or the
cumulative effects of the entire federal regulatory system, are on
business and industry. However, studies to provide some indication of those effects are presently underway. The National Science Foundation last year commenced studies of the benefits and
detriments of governmental regulations on the copper wire,
ground beef, and consumer financing services industries. But, if
these studies are ever completed, it will likely be years from now.
Another study on the effect of federal regulation of the iron
and steel industry is being conducted by the Council on Wage and
Price Stability. The first phase of that study, completed last
December, consisted of a catalog identifying federal regulations
which apply to this industry.1 2 The effect of those identified programs will be the subject of a later study. The initial study,
however, provided some interesting insights. First, the study was
limited to the direct manufacturing process and did not include
mining or the manufacture of steel products. The study found
that this portion of the iron and steel industry is regulated by at
least twenty-seven different federal agencies.
1 H.R. 2152, 33d Ariz. Leg., 1st Sess. (1977), was not reported out of the House
Health Committee; this bill would have implemented the EPA Safe Drinking Water Act
in Arizona.
12 COUNCIL
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The Council also found that in 1975 there were 7,305 final
rules and regulations and 3,042 proposals for new rules or amendments published in the Federal Register. Although it was not
determined which of these would affect the steel industry, the
study identified a total of more than 10,000 changes or potential
changes, within one year, in the rules of which businessmen had
to keep themselves informed. The Council expressed its concern
as follows:
The result of his understandable confusion and frustration with
them is a high level of uncertainty. He [the businessman] barely
grasps what he must do today; he can only imagine what he will be
asked to do tomorrow.
We are currently entering a period of several years when industry
will face near simultaneous compliance with a host of new health,
safety and environmental standards promulgated separately in past
years. The consequences of this timing coincidence are not known,
because it is a question that has never been addressed. It has never
been addressed because government has never felt inclined to examine the totality
of its actions from the perspective of those directly
3
affected.'

Compounding the problem of the multiplicity of regulations
is the nature and philosophy of many federal agencies in drawing
up and enforcing the regulations. A prime example of this problem is found in the Environmental Protection Agency. Instead of
being an objective administrator of the law, it is not incorrect to
say that the Environmental Protection Agency is a zealous and
dedicated advocate of environmental protection. This is acknowledged in one of EPA's own publications, THE CHALLENGE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: A PRIMER ON EPA's STATUTORY AUTHORITY: "It
[EPA] is an independent regulatory agency that has no obligation to promote agriculture, commerce or industry. It has only one
mission-to protect and enhance the environment."' 4 An example
of EPA's advocacy is indicated by a Chicago law firm's recent
charge that the Environmental Protection Agency lobbied in at
least four state legislatures for the passage of legislation to restrict
the use of nonreturnable drink containers.'" In this instance, EPA
Id. at VI.
11U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
13
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was faced with a statutory prohibition against lobbying in this
area. However, lobbying by EPA in state legislatures is inappropriate at any time.
One of the programs which appears to be particularly effective in extending federal controls to states is the one by which
EPA employees are assigned to work on a temporary basis in state
agencies. Recently I met with an EPA employee temporarily assigned as the director of a state agency who had drafted state
environmental legislation which would be ultimately administered by EPA. This employee was actively lobbying, while on
EPA's payroll, for the passage of this bill in the state legislature.
Participation by a federal employee in a state legislative process
seems to be inherently wrong.
Former President Ford made a pledge when he took office to
reduce the federal bureaucracy and regulations. Although there
is no reason to believe that best efforts were not made to carry
out this pledge, federal regulatory actions increased during his
term. On February 2, 1977, President Carter made a similar
pledge during his fireside chat. General statements of goals of this
nature are always easy to make and easy to break when specific
programs are addressed. The March 29, 1977, edition of the Wall
Street Journal reported that the President's environmental proposals expected to be released next week will include the following proposals for increased regulations:
1. Additional restrictions on off-road vehicles.
2. Limiting use of inland and coastal wetlands.
3. Ending coal strip mining on private agricultural lands.
4. Restricting coal mining in other areas.
5. Expanding the Endangered Species program.
6. Increasing the size of the Redwood National Park to prevent timber harvesting.
7. Strengthen auto pollution rules.
8. Create new wilderness areas.
9. Increase environmental standards for water development
projects.

618
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10. Increase environmental requirements for off-shore oil
and gas development."
Not much encouragement is provided by such a list proposing increasing federal regulations. Until such listings are reversed
to identify programs proposing deregulation and until those programs are carried out, prospects for a rationally balanced federal
system of environmental law are not bright.
" Wall St. Journal, Mar. 29, 1977 at 3, col. 2.

